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NOTES

Bribery Among the Korean Elite:
Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual
and Restoring Honor
ABSTRACT

On August 26, 1996, the criminal bribery convictions of
two former South Korean Presidents sent shockwaves
throughoutthe nation of South Korea. The courtfoundformer
Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Rof Tae Woo guilty of
amassing hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes during
their respective presidential terms. The court also found
corporate executives of major Korean conglomerates guilty of
bribing the former Presidents in exchange for government
contracts or politicalfavors. Such events invite a look into
South Korea's difficult past, revealing a history of remarkable
industrial progress tarnished by pervasive government
This Note first explores South Korea's
corruption.
sociocultural and political history in order to assess the
modern practice of bribery among public officials. The Note
then analyzes the Korean antibribery laws and evaluates the
legal machinery against corruption. The author determines
that the poor enforcement of the antibribery laws allowed
bribery to spread among public officials. Next, the author
describes a theoretical model for optimal law enforcement,
premised on efficiency, and applies its principles to the
present context. In the process, the authorproposes solutions
to resolve the current problem of government corruption,
emphasizing the need for optimal enforcement of the Korean
antibriberylaws. Although meaningful reform will be difficult
to achieve, the author concludes that the laws against bribery
can ultimately provide a government of integrity for South
Korea.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For great is truth, and shall prevail.1
Blinding flashes of light flooded the courtroom as cameras
focused upon two former Presidents inside a district court in
Seoul, South Korea (hereinafter "Korea"). 2 Once at the pinnacle of
political power, the two former Korean Presidents found
themselves defendants, humbly dressed in sky-blue prison
I

1.
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 30 n.3 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th
ed., Little Brown 1992) (1855) (quoting Thomas Brooks (1608-1680)).
2.
See Sheryl Wu Dunn, Death Sentence for Ex-President Chun a
Landmarkfor Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1996, at A4.
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uniforms, awaiting the court's verdicts. On August 26, 1996,
following a lengthy and highly publicized trial, the court found
former Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo guilty of
accepting hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes during their
respective presidential terms. 3 As a result of these convictions
and others for their role in a 1979 military coup, Chun was
sentenced to death, and Roh was sentenced to twenty-two years
and six months in prison. 4 These events have riveted the

attention of the Korean population both domestically and abroad.
Although the sentences will not likely be carried out, 5 assuming
they are upheld on appeal, 6 the convictions hopefully mark the
beginning of meaningful efforts to resolve the problem of
government corruption in Korea.
From being a war-torn country in the early 1950s, Korea has
now become a major contender in the global market. Through
tremendous export-oriented growth, Korea has achieved
exponential industrial development since its establishment as an
independent nation. 7 As a sign of its economic status, Korea is
presently among the top ten trading partners of the United
States.8
However, along with Korea's impressive industrial
development, there is a dark side to its success. Corruption
among public officials, in the form of bribery, has long plagued
Korea's political history. 9

3.
Id. See also Infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
4.
Wu Dunn, supra note 2. at A4. Chun was found guilty of mutiny,
insurrection, and bribery. Id. Roh was found guilty on similar charges. Id. The

two were also found guilty of manslaughter. See Ex-Leaders Appeal S. Korea
Sentences: Chun, Rok Fight Mutiny Convictions, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1996, at
A27, available in 1996 WL 6876090 [hereinafter Ex-Leaders Appeal].
5.
Many insiders believe that Chun will eventually be granted a
presidential pardon and that Roh's sentence will be reduced. See Wu Dunn,
supra note 2, at A4.
6.
Both Chun and Roh have appealed their respective convictions and
sentences. See Ex-Leaders Appeal, supra note 4, at A27. Appellate proceedings
may extend until April of 1997. See Infra note 98.
7.
See IL SAKONG, KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 8 (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 1993). In 1962, Korea's per capita gross
national product (GNP) was $87. Id. Since then, Korea has experienced rapid
industrial growth. In 1988, the year of the Seoul Olympics, the per capita GNP
figure reached $4,127. Id. In 1994, Korea's per capita GNP totaled $8,665. See
INTL MONETARY FUND, INT'L FIN. STAT. 354-57 (Aug. 1996).
8.
In 1995, Korea surpassed Germany to become the fifth-largest trading
partner to the United States. See Michael Schuman et al., Convictions In Korea
Highlight Anxieties Over Economy, Politics, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at Al.
Korea is presently the world's 11 th-largest economy. Id.
9.
The problem of bribery among public officials exists in many countries
worldwide. See generally Jay M. Vogelson, CorruptPractices in the Conduct of
InternationalBusiness, 30 INT'L LAw 193, 196-98 (1996) (reviewing recent efforts
within the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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For example, a bribery paradigm reportedly exists within the
Korean construction industry that has played a primary role in

numerous disasters.1°

Generally, when contractors allocate

funds for a construction project, they use a significant amount of
the funds to extend kickbacks to local public officials to acquire
permits or to bypass violations of safety standards."
After
distributing these bribes, the amount of funds remaining within
the construction budget is usually insufficient to cover the costs

of the necessary building materials as well as the requisite labor.
Thus the practice of bribery contributes to poor construction.
Poor construction, largely arising from the bribery paradigm,
has led to many fatal accidents. On June 29, 1995, a posh fivestory shopping mall in southern Seoul suddenly collapsed, killing
458 persons and leaving 132 missing. 12 The shopping mall

incident was the worst peacetime disaster in Korean history. The
five-story building spontaneously caved in because of poor
construction. Prosecutors arrested numerous city officials on
charges that the officials had received bribes from mall executives
to overlook construction safety violations in authorizing the mall's
opening in 1989.13 The incident was the culmination of a long
series of similar disasters in which public officials had received
payoffs.14

Development to address the problem of bribery in international business
transactions); Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct
to Include a Private Right of Actlon, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 216-29 (1994) (arguing
that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits U.S. corporations
from bribing foreign officials, should be amended to allow a private right of action
in order to improve both enforcement and clarification of the FCPA).
One
commentator proposes a treaty to regulate international corrupt payments made
by business representatives to foreign public officials. See Stephen Muffler,
Proposinga Treaty on the Prevention of InternationalCorruptPayments: Cloning the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct is Not the Answer, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 3, 27-39
(1995).
Despite the attractiveness of such a proposal, however, such an
international treaty would be difficult to enforce.
As discussed Infra, an
international body of law in this area would only be effective to the extent of each
nation's willingness to deal with the problem of bribery within its own borders.
See infra notes 172-244 and accompanying text.
10.
See John Burton, S. Korea Blames Lax Inspection, FIN. TIMS. July 4,
1995, at 6. available in 1995 WL 9139251. See also Teresa Watanabe, Builders:
A Double Standard in S. Korea, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1995, at Al. "One construction

company official told a news service reporter that payoffs drive up costs, leading
builders to cut more corners[:] 'Bribery is inevitable to do business here and then
we have to cut costs to make up the loss[.'" Id.
11.
See Burton, supra note 10, at 6.
12.
See 3 More Seoul Officials Arrested for Bribery, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
July 25, 1995, at A4, availablein 1995 WL 6098119.
13.
Id.
14.
See Steve Glain, Korea's Rush to Build Invites Tragedy-Store Collapse
Is Latest Example of Shoddy Construction, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1995, at A5.

1996]

BRIBERY AMONG THE KOREAN ELITE

1075

On July 31, 1992, ten piers of the Shin Haengju Grand

Bridge, under construction in western Seoul, collapsed. 15

On

January 7, 1993, the four-story Uam shopping and apartment
building in the city of Chongju collapsed, killing twenty-eight
persons. 16 On October 21, 1994, the Songsu Grand Bridge
17
collapsed in the middle of rush hour, killing thirty-two persons.
On December 7, 1994, a gas reservoir in western Seoul exploded,
killing twelve persons. 18 On April 28, 1995, an underground gas
explosion at a subway construction site in the 19city of Taegu killed
ninety-eight persons and injured many others.
Apart from the construction industry, bribery has also been a
long-standing practice between central government officials and
representatives of major corporations. 20 Since the early 1960s,
the government has heavily regulated the economy.2 1 Under a
powerful centralist government, the drive for industrial
development created an environment in which major corporations
bribed high-level public officials in exchange for favorable
Such favorable treatment included low-interest
treatment. 2 2
government loans, beneficial tax regulation, and tariff protection
Bribery has become quite
against foreign competition. 2 3
bodies,
government
local
across
spreading
pervasive,
24
administrative agencies, and other bureaucratic organizations.
For instance, a driver wishing to avoid a traffic citation may give
money to a police officer. 25 A local civic servant may receive

Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id. See also Steve Glain, Broken Bridge May Hasten Industry Reform in
17.
Korea, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1994, at A3, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
Glain, supra note 14, at A5. See also Numerous City Officials Arrested
18.
In Ahyun Gas Explosion, DONG-AH DAILY, Dec. 10, 1994, at 1 (Korean language

only, translated by author).
19.

Glain. supra note 14, at A5.

See also Taegu Gas Explosion Kills 98,

Injures 143, DONG-AH DAILY, Apr. 29, 1995, at 1 (Korean language only, translated

by author).
See Infranotes 44-64 and accompanying text.
20.
21.

See WALDEN BELLO & STEPHANIE ROSENFELD, DRAGONS IN DISTRESS 50-51

(1990).
See Infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
22.
See nfra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
23.
See South Korea's Leader Boasts Own Style-Apart from Military, LAS
24.
VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 5, 1993, at 12A, available in 1993 WL 4485643 [hereinafter
Korea's Leader Boasts Own Style] (stating, "Millions of dollars are spent to grease
the palms of bureaucrats for permits, bank loans and even to get children into

elite primary schools.").
See Paul Shin, S. Korea Reformers Face Bribery as Way of Lffe. CHI.
25.
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at 30, availablein 1993 WL 6520303.
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money from a resident seeking approval for the construction of a
26
new home.
The prevalence of bribery among public officials does not

suggest that the Korean people lack a sense of morality. The
Korean people share the same moral and ethical standards
regarding bribery as people in Western cultures. 2 7 The practice of
bribery, however, persists in Korea despite the existence of
antibribery laws specifically aimed at public officials. 2 8 The
problem stems from cultural and political origins, dating back to
early Korean history. One must examine Korea's sociocultural
and political background in order to understand the present
problem of bribery. When one superimposes the practice of
bribery against such a backdrop, one can identify meaningful
solutions to the present problem.
Part II of this Note discusses the sociocultural and political
history of Korea in order to examine the modern practice of
bribery in its proper context. Part III analyzes the antibribery
laws and evaluates the legal machinery against bribery. Part IV
describes the optimal enforcement theory as a model for efficient
enforcement of the antibribery laws. Finally, Part V applies the
principles of the optimal enforcement theory to the present
situation, in light of Korea's national policy objectives, in an
attempt to propose viable solutions to the problem of government
corruption. Solutions to the present problem require optimal
enforcement of the antibribery laws, an amendment to the Korean
Constitution subjecting the President to immediate criminal
sanctions for bribery committed while in office, and increases in
salaries for low-level public employees.
Although efforts to
26.
Id. Bribery has almost become a norm in terms of having an
administrative function performed. When a Seoul resident needed water in her

new building, it cost her approximately $5,000 in bribes to have city officials
ignore a government that would have prohibited the construction. She also had
to give bribes to acquire permits, have utilities installed, and to ensure that the
work was completed. Id. In another instance, a hair salon owner was charged
with organizing and controlling a bribery scheme.
See Merrill Goozner,
Revelations of Far-Reaching Corruption Stun Koreans-Prosecutors Even Allege
Bribery in Miss Korea Contests, S.F. EXAMINER, July 3. 1993. at A3, available In
1993 WL 8579303. Through the assistance of the hair salon owner, the mothers
of three prior Miss Koreas each allegedly bribed the director of the pageant to
increase their daughters' chances of winning. Id.
27.
See Suk Jo Kim, A Theory of Pseudo-Community: The Formal Law In
Korea, In INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 68, 71 (Sang Hyun
Song ed., 1983). "A majority of Koreans are aware of the historic principle of
nullum crimen sine lege. (Only law can define an act as a crime.) They do not
accept the notion of sovereign immunity for governmental wrongdoing." Id. The
Korean antibribery laws also reflect the Korean culture's moral condemnation of
bribery. See Infra note 91.
28.
See Infra notes 91-162 and accompanying text.
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decrease the incidence of bribery will be difficult to achieve, this
Note concludes that the laws against bribery can ultimately

provide a government of integrity for Korea.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. SocloculturalRoots from the Yi Dynasty
Korea's early cultural influence was China. 2 9 In assuming its
own identity, the Korean culture maintained Confucianist
ideology, conformist views oriented towards the collective group,
and a pyramid-structured hierarchical social system-all of which
were derived from the Chinese culture. 30 However, the Korean
culture adopted its own unique characteristics, especially the
The political structure
development of its own language. 3 1
consisted of a centralized form of monarchy, premised on
Confucianism, during the Yi Dynasty (1392l1910).32
The social structure mirrored the political structure and a
clear division existed between the upper and lower classes. 3 3 One
showed respect for authority in terms of social status, according
to occupation or age, and such respect contributed to social
order. 34 The highly orthodox culture conformed to tradition and
Cultural norms
prevented any deviations from the norm.3 5
promoted group solidarity and disfavored individualism. 3 6 In
particular, the legal system achieved social harmony through the
imposition of strict penal provisions. 3 7 The law, however, was not
enforced consistently. Those of the ruling elite and upper social
class remained above the law, and law enforcement was largely

29.

See PYONG-CHOON HAHM, THE KOREAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND LAW 7

(1967).
30.
See Id at 9.
31.
Id. at 11. See also BYUNG-NAK SONG, THE RISE OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY
46 (1990). King Sejong invented the Korean language in 1443. Id.
32.
HAHM, supra note 29, at 8-9.
Id. at 36-37.
33.
34.
See DONALD S. MACDONALD, THE KOREANS: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 80 (1988). Respect for authority remains a cornerstone of the Korean
culture. For example, one bows to a senior person at the workplace, or to an
elderly person in social contexts. Id. It is also considered offensive to cross one's

legs in front of a person with higher social status. Id.
35.
36.
37.

HAHM, supra note 29, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 20-21.
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restricted to the common people. 38 Such a practice would later
39
manifest itself within the political arena in the modern day era.
B. Politics UnderMilitary Regimes After the Korean War
-A Tale of Greed and Corruption
In 1961, Park Chung Hee took control of the government
through a military coup. 4 0
Under the Third Republic, the
following eighteen years of rule under Park's regime largely set the
political and industrial foundation for Korea. After Park acquired
control, he implemented an ambitious economic agenda that
centered upon export-oriented growth. 4 1 The government heavily
regulated the economy and instituted a series of five-year plans
focused on building the economy. 4 2 Over the course of such fiveyear plans, the government remained closely involved with large
corporations, requesting
dedicated support towards national
43
industrial development.
Amidst the drive for industrial growth, however, something
existed that could only taint Korea's economic success and

38.
Id. at 42. Hahm observes that the early Korean legal system adopted
the Chinese tradition that law and punishment were to be applied only to the
masses and not against the ruling elite. Id. The law primarily disciplined the
lower class, while the upper class remained unaffected by the legal system. "The
powerful and the privileged had little cause to be restrained by legal rules and
administrative regulations. No one, including law-enforcement officials, dared to
raise any objections when they ignored them." Id. at 68.
39.
See infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text. During numerous royal
successions over the course of the Yi Dynasty, many wars were fought with the
Japanese. See MARK L. CLIFFORD, TROUBLED TIGER 26 (1994). In 1910, the Korean
peninsula ultimately fell to the Japanese and became subject to colonial rule. Id.
The Korean peninsula remained a colony until the end of World War II in 1945.
Id. at 28. The independence of Korea, however, was determined by foreign
influences. Id. Korea was divided at the 38 degree parallel, with the Soviet Union
occupying the North, and the United States occupying the South. Relations
between the North and South deteriorated because of political differences. Id. In
1948, both sides respectively declared independence, with the North as the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the South as the Republic of Korea.
Id. at 29. After the Soviet Union and the United States withdrew their military
forces from the North and the South respectively, the North invaded the South to
spark the Korean War in 1950. Id. Following the 1953 armistice, after the mass
destruction of war, South Korea was left with the difficult task of rebuilding itself
as a nation. Id. at 30.
40.
Id. at 36-37.
41.
See SUNG MOON PAE, KOREA LEADING DEVELOPING NATIONS 78-80 (1992).
Prior to the Third Republic, the Korean economy was largely import-oriented due
to a manufacturing industry which lacked the capacity to generate assembled
products. Id.
42.
Id. at 73.
43.
See Id.
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national pride. Park's regime created an atmosphere ripe for
corruption through the exercise of coercive power over large
corporations. In pursuing its economic agenda, the government
controlled major conglomerates, known as chaebols, through the
use of various regulatory incentives and sanctions. 4 4 In exchange
for cooperation by large corporations, the government provided
preferential access to low-interest loans, tariff protection against
tax benefits, and controls on foreign
foreign competition,
45
investment.
The government-chaebol network gradually led to a
concentration of wealth among the top business conglomerates
and created an oligopolistic system. 46 Controversy surrounded
the alliance between the government and the selective group of
conglomerates, and the people began to express ambivalence
towards the system of governmental favoritism. 4 7 Societal belief
that the government was corrupt steadily grew, as the public
perception of the government-chaebol relationship worsened
of Chun Doo Hwan, 4 8 who succeeded Park
under the leadership
9
4
Chung Hee.

Corruption within the government-chaebol alliance reportedly
consisted of a ritualistic practice of bribery among the political
and industrial elite. 50 In return for regulatory incentives, large

44.
See BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 21, at 51-52. The Korean chaebols
are comparable to their Japanese counterpart known as the kelretsu, which refers
to the collaborative system of major Japanese corporations. See also CLYDE V.
PREsToWITz, JR., TRADING PLAcES 43, 294-302 (1988). Receiving favorable support
from the government, large corporations of the kelretsu maintain a cooperative
network of fiscal policy which act as a barrier to foreign competition. Id.
45.
BELLO & ROSENFELD, supranote 21, at 51-55.

Id. at 63-64. In 1988, the combined revenues for the top four
46.
chaebols-Samsung, Hyundai. Lucky-Goldstar, and Daewoo, in descending
order-totaled over $80 billion, or about 60% of Korea's GNP of $135 billion. Id.
at 63 (citing The Rise of Korea In the Electronics Market, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
(Toronto: Domicity, 1989)).
Id. at 73-74.
47.
Id. at 71.
48.
See Sung-Joo Han, South Korean Politics and Its Impact on Foreign
49.
Relations, in ASIA AND THE MAJOR POWERS 161, 162 (Robert A. Scalapino et al. eds.,
1988). In 1979, Park was assassinated by his chief intelligence aide. Id. at 161.
The assassination was purportedly committed to prevent an attempt to overthrow
the government that would cost many lives, in light of growing protests against
the coercive Park regime. Id. Park's assassination provided an opportunity for
the democratization of Korea. Id. at 162. However, in 1980, General Chun Doo
Hwan usurped political power and authoritarian military rule would continue. Id.
Martial law was imposed to suppress demonstrations, resulting in many civilian
deaths, especially in the city of Kwangju. Id. at 163. Chun Doo Hwan and Roh
Tae Woo were later convicted for their roles in the Kwangju incident. See Infra
note 61.

50.

CLIFFORD, supra note 39, at 123.
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corporations extended bribes to high-level government officials.
Such bribes were disguised as "donations" or "contributions" for
various charitable causes and political campaigns.5 1 During
Chun's term of leadership, an organization known as the Ilhae
Foundation served as a vehicle for collecting illicit payments. 5 2
One commentator notes:
lhae was only the largest of dozens of official foundations and
government projects that relied on donations from businesses.
These contributions were, in many cases. just a half-step up from
outright extortion. They were the price of doing business in a
country where the government could destroy companies or, as was
commonly the case, rescue them from their own mistakes.
Because most of this fund-raising was secret, it is difficult to know
53
with any certainty the total amount of business contributions.

The practice of receiving large corporate contributions through
various political foundations, or slush funds, occurred throughout
Chun's term and continued during the following presidential term
under Roh Tae Woo. Both Chun and Roh would later regret
having solicited such corporate contributions.
In December of 1995, Chun and Roh were indicted for

allegedly accepting bribes during their respective presidential

terms.' 4 Chun allegedly received $275 million in bribes as part of
a $900 million political slush fund amassed during his 1980-88
term.5 5 Roh allegedly accepted bribes, in exchange for large
government contracts, through a massive political slush fund as
well during his 1988-93 term.5 6
Roh's scandal erupted on
October 19, 1995, when a legislator of an opposition party
publicly disclosed one of Roh's secret bank accounts, which held
a large amount of funds.5 7 Facing public pressure, Roh appeared

51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 208.
53.
Id. at 208. Hyundai's chairman, Chung Ju-Yung, was designated to
act as "bag man" for the Ilhae Foundation, with the task of collecting $40 million
from other corporations within three years. See BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note
21, at 72. In one instance, the Kukje-ICC conglomerate, according to Its former
chairman, was dismantled for refusing to make donations to the llhae
Foundation. Id. at 73. When KukJe was liquidated, its steel subsidiary was given
to Dongkuk Steel, and a large portion of its stock was sold below market value to
Hanil Synthetics. Both Dongkuk and Hanfl were major contributors to the Ilhae
Foundation. Id.
54.
See Korea's Chun, Rok Indicted ForTheir Roles In '79 Coup, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Dec. 22, 1995, at 8, available in 1995 WL-WSJA 10231704 [hereinafter
Korea's Chun, Roh Indicted].
55.
See Namju Cho, Rok Repudiates Bribery Charge In Testimony, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 3324835.
56.
Korea's Chun, Roh Indicted, supra note 54, at 8.
57.
See Paul Shin, South Koreans Grill Roh on Slush Fund; Arrest Expected,
COM. APPEAL, Nov. 16, 1995, at 2A, available In 1995 WL 10965135.
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on live national television and with tears admitted to collecting
$650 million during his term, and leaving $230 million in secret
bank accounts. 58 Roh claimed that his slush fund was merely a
political practice,
continuation of a long-standing informal
59
followed by all of his military predecessors.
On August 26, 1996, Chun and Roh were both found guilty of
bribery. 60 Apart from the imposition of multiple prison terms,
Chun and Roh were fined $270 million and $350 million
respectively. 6 1 Nine other former government officials were found
guilty of assisting either Chun or Roh in accepting bribes.6 2 In
addition, nine major corporate executives were convicted and
heavily fired for bribing Roh during his presidential term. 6 3 Four

See Korea's Chun, Roh Indicted, supra note 54, at 8. See also Jim
58.
Doyle, 2 Koreans Hid Money in Bay Banks-$200,000 Penalty for Kin of South
Korea's President S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28, 1993, at A13. The daughter and son-inlaw of Roh pleaded guilty to money laundering charges in a federal district court
in San Jose. California. Id. The couple agreed to forfeit $192,577 in deposits and

pay $30,000 in fines. Id. Both acknowledged violating U.S. currency laws by
attempting to conceal an undisclosed amount of money in 11 Bay Area banks. Id.
59.
Korea's Chun, Roh Indicted, supranote 54, at 8.
60.
See Wu Dunn, supra note 2. at A4. See also Sandra Sugawara, Seoul
The
Court Convicts Top Industrialists, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1996. at Al.
convictions of Chun and Roh were influenced by political factors. When Kim
Young Sam assumed the Presidency in 1993, Kim initially left the fate of Chun
and Roh to be "Judged by history." See Korea's Chun, Roh Indicted, supra note 54,
at 8. Kim had reason for such action since he had received political support from
Roh prior to winning the presidential election. However, after the loss of popular
support during the latter half of his presidential term, Kim ordered the
indictments of Chun and Roh for their involvement in the 1979 military coup as
well as for bribery. The indictments followed the passage of special legislation
that waived the statute of limitations by discounting Chun and Roh's time in
offlce. Opponents argued that such action was unconstitutional because it was
Id. Apart from this controversy, President Kim's vast reform
retroactive.
measures, implemented soon after he took office, are not to be understated. See
Infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
61.
See Sugawara, supra note 60, at Al. Under the Korean antibribery
laws, the punishment for bribery involving a sum over $64,000 includes
imprisonment for at least 10 years. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
The punishment available under the antibribery statutes were included in the
respective sentences imposed upon Chun and Roh, in light of other prison terms
imposed for their convictions for mutiny and treason. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. Chun and Roh were convicted for mutiny and treason for
their involvement in the 1979 Kwangju incident when Chun usurped power
through a military coup. See supranote 49.

62.

Sugawara, supranote 60, at Al.

63.

Id. Four corporate executives were given prison terms. Among this

group of four, the founder and chairman of one of the largest chaebols, Daewoo,
was sentenced to a two-year prison term. Financial analysts predict that the four
corporate executives will eventually receive suspended sentences, or brief prison
terms, since their imprisonment would hurt the economy. The remaining five
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of the nine corporate executives were each found to have bribed
Roh between $13 million to $20 million during his 1988-93
64
term.
Chun and Roh are the first former Presidents in Korean
history to be prosecuted and convicted for bribery. 65 Such legal
action has largely been possible through vast reform efforts under
the new leadership of President Kim Young Sam. In 1993,
through a direct popular vote, the Korean people elected Kim as
the first civilian-President after thirty-two years of authoritarian
rule under military regimes. 6 6
Upon his inauguration, Kim
publicly declared, "I shall not accept political donations from
anyone." 6 7 Kim referred to past government corruption as being

part of the "Korean disease," which had spread from the top and

68
pervaded down to all lower levels of the government.
After Kim took office, sweeping reforms soon followed. 69 Kim
appointed reform-minded persons to key positions within the
administration, and publicly disclosed his personal assets,
reaffirming that he would refuse to accept any illicit payments
during his term. 70 The National Assembly passed amendments to
the Ethics in Public Service Act that require all public officials
falling within its broad provisions to register their personal
assets.7 1 The disclosure of assets revealed the ownership of large

corporate executives received suspended sentences. Lee Kun Hee, the chairman

of Korea's largest conglomerate, Samsung, was among the latter group. Id.
64.
S. Korean Industrialists Jailed and Fined for Bribing President,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Aug. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File.
65.
Schuman et al., supra note 8, at Al.
66.
See Deog Ryong Kim, Reform and National Development, 17 KOREA AND
WORLD AFFAIRS 405, 405-06 (1993). See also Korea's Leader Boasts Own Style,
supra note 24, at 12A. Kim was inaugurated on February 25, 1993, to a five-year
term. Id.
67.
Kim, supra note 66, at 411.
68.
Id. at 406.
69.
See Soon-Hoom KMl, Political Reforms of the Kim Young Sam
Government, 17 KOREAAND WORLD AFFAIRS 419, 421-26 (1993).
70.
Id. at 422.
71.

CURRENT

LAWS

OF THE

REPUBLIC

OF KOREA 295-97

(Government

Legislative Administration Agency of the Republic of Korea ed., 1984) [hereinafter
KOREAN LAws]. The Ethics in Public Service Act, Law No. 3520 (Dec. 31, 1981),
primarily requires the registration of enumerated assets. Article 15 requires a
public official to report the receipt of any gift from a foreign government official or

foreigner. Id. at 297-10. Reported gifts revert back to the national treasury under
Article 16. Id. Failure to register assets in accordance with the applicable
provisions may result in dismissal (by the public official ethics committee) or

criminal sanctions under Article 2. Id. at 297-12-297-14. Criminal sanctions can
be imposed for the following: (1) taking advantage of any secret learned in the
course of official duties; (2) refusal to register property; (3) submitting false

materials regarding registration; (4) failure to attend a public official ethics
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amounts of personal and real property among many officials,
supporting public suspicion of the illegal accumulation of wealth
within the government. 72 Many officials resigned because of
criticism by the press and public censure.7 3
President Kim also mandated the use of "real names" in all
decree. 74
a presidential
financial transactions through
Previously, one could maintain a bank account under a fictitious
name. Under the "real name" system, a bank account may be
held only under one's legal name. This measure exposed large

sums of "black money"-under-the-table political contributionsand has made it difficult for officials to maintain illicit funds in
multiple bank accounts under fictitious names. 75 Additionally,
the National Assembly passed amendments to the laws governing
political campaigns. The amendments place statutory limits on
campaign contributions in order to discourage illicit payments to
political candidates. 76
The foregoing regulatory changes
supplement the antibribery laws by making it difficult to conceal
accepted bribes. Such reform measures alone will not, however,
solve the problem of government corruption. These measures
merely begin the long and arduous process of addressing the
effects of over thirty years of prior government corruption.
C. The Nature of the Bribe-A CulturalRitual?

Before discussing the legal background regarding bribery, as
well as possible solutions to the problem, one must understand
the nature of the act itself. Obviously, bribery is not only illegal,
but also immoral in that it contradicts fundamental principles of
fairness and loyalty. However, before one condemns an act as a
bribe, one must clearly identify operative elements of the act
itself.77 One scholar observes, "The core of the concept of a bribe
is an inducement improperly influencing the performance of a
public function meant to be gratuitously exercised.

.

. . The

concrete constituent elements-what counts as 'an inducement,'
what counts as 'improperly influencing,' what counts as 'a public

committee hearing; (5) inspection and reproduction of property registration
without permission; (6) disclosure of matters related to property registration that
is non-public; and (7) employment in a profit-making private enterprise. Id.
72.
Kil, supra note 69, at 422.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 423,
75.
Id. at 423-24.
76.
See KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 65-75.
77.
See JOHNT. NOONAN, JR., BRIBE xid (1984).
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gratuitously

exercised'-change with the culture."
Cultural factors influence the concept of a bribe. As noted
above, in contrast to the individualistic and egalitarian
characteristics of the Western culture, the Korean culture focuses

upon the collective group and abides by a pyramid-structured
social status hierarchy.79 Similar to the political context of the Yi
Dynasty, the modem political leaders of successive military
regimes assumed tight control over economic affairs and largely
remained above the law.8 0 Consistent with the cultural norm of
being deferential towards authority, nobody forcefully challenged
the actions of the political leadership.8 1 Government leaders were
thus prone to engage in corruption through the abuse of their
power. Hence, cultural factors partly contributed to the practice
of bribery within the political realm.
Cultural norms have favored the practice of bribery in
another manner. The Korean culture stresses reciprocation as
the foundation to interpersonal relationships.8 2 Bestowing a gift

or favor to someone constitutes a symbolic expression of one's
loyalty to another, and serves as a primary means of maintaining
Given the predominance of such
a social relationship.8 3
reciprocation, does the Korean culture make it more difficult to
distinguish between a gift and a bribe, thus making bribery an
accepted practice?
If the offering of money in exchange for a public function
were an accepted cultural practice, no further discussion of the
current topic would be necessary. The only remaining task would
be to explain the aspects of the Korean culture that would provide
an understanding of such a practice from a sociocultural
perspective.
However, from a sociocultural standpoint, the
answer to the foregoing question is in the negative. As stated
earlier, the Korean people share the same moral standards as the
Western culture regarding bribery. They are equally capable of

78.
79.
80.

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.

81.
Although minority opposition continued throughout the periods of
military rule, in the form of student protests, the majority of the population
conformed with the status quo and did not stage any organized revolutionary
movements. See, e.g., John Burgess, Korean Demonstrators Renew Protests In
Streets, WASH. POST, June 27, 1987, at Al; Korean Students Jailed, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1985, § 1. at 8.
82.
83.

MACDONALD, supra note 34, at 78-80.
Id. at 80.
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distinguishing between what is intended to be gratuitous
and
84
what is intended to wrongfully influence another person.
Cultural norms have contributed to the practice of bribery
only in the sense of permitting it to become pervasive. In light of
the Korean culture, there will simply be a higher tendency for one
to attempt to mask a bribe as a gift, thus increasing one's
susceptibility to engage in bribery. 8 5 However, cultural norms do
not affect the concept of bribery by making the practice less
condemnable relative to Western standards. In the past, the
Korean people generally chose not to outwardly challenge the
government, conforming to the traditional norms of being
obedient toward authority for the sake of national harmony. 6 Yet
87
the public remained inwardly critical of government corruption.
Indeed, amidst recent reforms, some Koreans have broken with
traditional culture and a public backlash against the former
corrupt political regimes has developed. 8 8 Thus, bribery has
become a cultural ritual only in the sense that it is a prevalent
practice, but not in the sense that it is a morally accepted
practice.

III. POLICING THE PRACTICE OF BRIBERY

A. The Antibribery Laws--Statute and Case Law
Formulating a legal definition for bribery seems simple at first
glance. But when one attempts to articulate a standard, which
intelligibly distinguishes between lawful and unlawful exchanges,
the difficulty of such a task soon emerges. For instance, is a
corporate political contribution of one million dollars legal or
suspect? This question reveals that effective antibribery laws
must sensibly distinguish between a gift, a political contribution,
and a bribe. One must identify elements that determine when the
two former types of exchanges, both legally acceptable, cross the
line and change in character to become an illegal bribe. An
analysis of the Korean antibribery statutes and case law will show
how the Korean law draws the line between legal and illegal
exchanges.

84.
See, e.g., Memorial Turns Into Melee, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., July 30,
1995, at A25. availablein 1995 WL 5730732. See also supra note 27.
85.
MAcDoNALD, supra note 34, at 80.
86.
See supranotes 35-36, 81 and accompanying text.
87.
Id. See also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
88.
See Those DeferentialAsians, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 12.
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8 9 With
Korean law comprises general and special statutes.
respect to the offense of bribery, the general statutes contain the
provisions regarding the elements of the offense and punishment.
The special statutes derive from the general statutes and impose
more severe punishment in those specific situations stipulated to
by the applicable statute. When both a general and special
statute apply, only the special statute governs. 90 According to
Article 129, Subsection (1), of the Korean Criminal Code, "A

public official ... who receives, demands or promises to accept a
bribe in connection with his duties . . ." is guilty of the bribery

offense. 9 ' Conversely, under Article 133, Subsection (1), of the
Korean Criminal Code, "A person who promises, delivers or
manifests a will to deliver a bribe .. ." is also in violation of the

89.

See Infra notes 91, 93 and accompanying text.
JAE-SANG LEE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25 (1988) (Korean language only,
translated by author).
91.
KOREAN LAws, supra note 71, at 779. The general statutes related to
the bribery offense involving public officials are enumerated in Articles 129
through 134, under the heading, "Crimes Concerning the Duties of Public
Officials." Relevant provisions within this Section are:
90.

Article 129 (Acceptance of Bribe and Advance Acceptance)
(1)
A public official... who receives, demands or promises to
accept a bribe in connection with his duties, shall be punished by penal
servitude for not more than five years or suspension of qualifications for
not more than ten years.
(2)
If a person who is to become a public official ... receives,
demands or promises to accept a bribe in response to a solicitation, in
connection with the duty which he is to perform and he actually becomes
a public official . . .. penal servitude for not more than three years or
suspension of qualifications for not more than seven years shall be
imposed.
Article 130 (Bribe to Third Person)
A public official.., who causes, demands or promises a bribe to be
given to a third party on acceptance of an unjust solicitation In connection
with his duties shall be punished by penal servitude for not more than five
years or suspension of qualifications for not more than ten years.
Article 133 (Delivery of Bribe)
(1)
A person who promises, delivers or manifests a will to
deliver a bribe as stated in Articles 129 through the preceding Article shall
be punished by penal servitude for not more than five years or by a fine
not exceeding twenty-five thousand Hwan.
(2)
The preceding Paragraph shall apply to a person who, for
the purpose of committing the crime specified in the preceding Paragraph,
delivers money or goods to a third party, or receives such delivery with the
knowledge of its nature.
Id. at 779-80. The statute of limitations period for the bribery offense under
Article 129, Subsection (1). is five years. Id. at 815.
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Apart from the foregoing general
antibribery provisions. 9 2
statutes, special statutes impose heavier punishment if the sum
of the bribe that a public official receives, demands, or promises
to accept, exceeds the statutory amount. 93 In order to prove an
offense under Article 129, the government must show the
following:
(1) a public official; (2) received, demanded, or
promised to accept a bribe; (3) in connection with his duties; (4)
with criminal intent. 9 4 The case law further refines these
elements, which are discussed below in their respective order.

92.
Id. at 780.
93.
Special statutes related to the bribery offense are enumerated in
Articles 2 through 4, under the heading, "Special Statutes Providing for Heavier
Punishment for Criminal Offenses." Relevant provisions within this Section are:
Article 2 (Heavier Punishment for Acceptance of Bribe)
Any person who commits the offense as specified in Articles 129,
130, or 132 of the Criminal Code, shall be punished according to the
following (if the amount of the bribe which a public official receives.
demands or promises to accept exceeds the amount stated in the following
subdivisions);
(1)
When the amount of the bribe exceeds 50 million won

[$64,000], the punishment shall be life imprisonment or penal servitude
for not less than ten years.
When the amount of the bribe exceeds 10 million won
(2)
[$13,000], but less than 50 million won, the punishment shall be penal
servitude for not less than five years.
Article 4 (Extension of the Application of the Antibribery Provisions)
(1)
In the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the
Criminal Code, management-level employees of government-owned
corporations shall be deemed public officials.
(2)
The range of management-level employees of governmentowned corporations referred to in subdivision (1) shall be determined
according to Presidential Decree.
HYUN-AM, COLLECTION OF STATUTES 1667 (Sung-Won Cho ed., 1996) (Korean
language only, translated by author). The statute of limitations period is 10 years
under Article 2, Subsection (1), of the special statutes. Id. at 815.
94.
The government has the burden of proving each element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. LEE, supra note 90, at 458. A defendant or suspect
is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Id. at 466. All criminal cases are
bench-tried and there is no Jury system. Id. Although lower courts are not bound
by precedent, higher court decisions are persuasive. Id.
The legal analysis primarily focuses on antibribery statutes governing public
officials under Article 129 of the Korean Criminal Code. See infra notes 95-171
and accompanying text. Although both the donor and the donee involved in an
illegal exchange are culpable, the legal analysis focuses on the public official's
perspective, as the official has the higher duty not to abuse a position of public
trust. For example, under Chapter VII of the National Civil Service Act, Article 59

imposes a duty upon the public official to work "impartially as servant of all
citizens." KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 293-19-293-20. In addition, Article 61
states, "No public official may give or receive directly or indirectly any reward,
donation or entertainment in connection with his duties." Id. As administrative
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1. Public Official
The term "public official" is largely defined according to
statute, with relatively few cases interpreting this term. Public
officials obviously include all of those holding positions within the
legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the government. 9 5
Chapter III of the Korean Constitution vests legislative power in
the National Assembly, which must consist of at least 200
members. 9 6 As for the judicial branch, Chapter V establishes the
Supreme Court as the highest court of the State. 9 7 The Court
Organization Act outlines more specific guidelines regarding the
98
structure of the judicial system.
Chapter IV of the Constitution designates the President as
the Head of State, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces. 9 9
The Government Organization Act provides
overall guidelines for the establishment, organization, and the
10 0
scope of function of national administrative agencies.
Presidential decrees designate the types and fixed number of
public officials within each administrative agency.1 0 '
As for
employees of government-owned corporations,
those that

law, the National Civil Service Act designates disciplinary committees within
agencies to decide upon disciplinary action if a public official violates any of its
provisions. Id. at 293-29. Categories of discipline include removal, dismissal,
suspension from office, reduction of pay, and reprimand. Id. at 293-28.
95.
Korea is a nation-state and thus operates under one system of
government.
96.
KoREAN LAws. supra note 71, at 8. Members of the National Assembly
serve four-year terms and are elected by "universal, equal, direct and secret ballot
by the citizens." Id.
97.
Id. at 17.
98.
Id. at 301. The courts are divided into four categories, consisting of
the Supreme Court, high courts (appellate courts), district courts, and family

courts. Id. District courts and family courts are further divided into branch
courts, juvenile branch courts, circuit courts, and registry offices. Id. The
Supreme Court, consisting of 15 justices, decides cases of final appeal and cases
of reappeal against a decision or decree made by a high court or district court. Id.
at 303-04. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power of judicial
review over administrative decrees, regulations, and administrative actions. Id. at
18.
The Supreme Court also has final appellate jurisdiction over military appeals
courts (which decide cases appealed from military courts). Id. at 19. However,
Chapter VI establishes a separate Constitutional Court, consisting of nine
justices, to decide on the constitutionality of laws, the dissolution of a political
party, mpeachment, jurisdictional disputes within the executive branch, and
petitions relating to the Constitution as prescribed by law. Id. Thus, if the
constitutionality of law is at issue, the Supreme Court must request a decision of
the Constitutional Court. Id. at 18.
99.
Id. at 12-13.
100. Id. at 251.
101. Id.
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maintain a position above a statutory occupational level are
considered public officials and fall within the provisions of the
antibribery statutes.1 0 2 In sum, the number and types of public
positions are generally determined by statute or by presidential
decrees.
The few cases falling close to the line that divides public and
non-public positions usually involve an employee within an
administrative agency. In State v. Lee, 10 3 the defendant was an
employee of the Cultural Properties Management Bureau, an
administrative agency.10 4 The defendant was responsible for the
collection of payments related to contracts involving the purchase
and sale of land parcels. The Korean Supreme Court found that
the defendant's responsibilities were more than "simplistically
mechanical or physical in nature."1 0 5 The defendant was thus

held to be a "public official" under Article 129.106

The Court's definition of the term "public official" leaves open
a degree of uncertainty for those positions that may fall close to
the line separating public and non-public positions. In borderline
cases, it may be difficult to determine whether a bureaucratic
function, performed by a local civic servant, is "simplistically
However, for present
mechanical or physical in nature."
purposes, it is sufficient that the term "public official" clearly
includes high-level officials such as members of the National
Assembly, as well as all executive ministry officials. As long as
Article 129 applies to such officials, the antibribery provisions
potentially have sufficient jurisdiction to police high-level
government corruption.

I0 7

2. Bribe
A public official violates Article 129 if he receives, demands,
or promises to accept a "bribe."'0 8 As for what constitutes a
"bribe," the Korean Supreme Court broadly construed the term to

102.
See supranote 93.
103.
Judgment of Apr. 25. 1978, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 77 do 3709
(Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
104. Id.
Id.
105.
106.
Id. See also Judgment of Oct. 19, 1971 (State v. Ahn), Daebubwon
[Supreme Court], 71 do 1113 Daepahn 43 (Korea) (holding that the antibribery
provisions also apply to those who are "temporarily employed" in public positions)
(Korean language only, translated by author).
107. Only a constitutional amendment is necessary to broaden the
jurisdictional reach of the antibribery laws to allow criminal sanctions against the

President for bribery committed during the presidential term.
216-33 and accompanying text.
108. KoREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 779.

See Infra notes
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include "any monetary, property, or other material interest, as
well as any tangible or intangible benefit, which may satisfy a
human demand or desire." 0 9 A "bribe" also includes "any
opportunity to participate in a business venture." 110 In State v.
Chung,"' an executive officer of a private construction company
gave 200 shares of the company's stock to a public official at face
value, which was below the market price of the shares, in
exchange for political favors. 11 2 The defendant-official contended
that the market price for the shares subsequently dropped below
face value and argued that the shares did not constitute a bribe.
The Court, however, held that the actual market price of the
shares was irrelevant in determining whether the shares
constituted a bribe. 1 13 The defendant-official's mere "expectation"
that the shares had value was sufficient to deem the shares a
"bribe."11 4 The Court held that if the defendant-official personally

believed that the shares had value, the stock constituted a bribe
regardless of whether he accurately assessed the value of the
shares.115
In State v. Song, 1 16 the director of a residential association
granted membership to numerous persons, at the request of a
public official, without charging them the required premium
Each member of the association acquired the right to
fees."
purchase one residential unit within a newly constructed
apartment complex. In return for the extension of membership to
those selected by the official, the official promised to approve the
construction of the apartment complex upon its completion.
Although the official did not receive any monetary benefit himself,
the Court held that the monetary benefit received by those
selected by the official constituted an "intangible benefit" for the
official." 8 This "intangible benefit," deriving from the fact that

109. Judgment of Oct. 10, 1979 (State v. Chung), Daebubwon [Supreme
Court], 78 do 1793 Daepahn 16 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by
author).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 17.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id. See also Judgment of Sept. 5. 1995 (State v. Ahn), Daebubwon
[Supreme Court], 95 do 1269 Daepahn 105 (Korea) (an option to buy a parcel of
land was held to constitute a "bribe," despite consideration tendered for the
option by the defendant-official, due to the "expectation" of a rise in the option's
market value) (Korean language only, translated by author).
116. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1992, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 92 do 1762
Daepahn 46 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
117. Id. at 47.
118. Id. at 47-48.
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fees were not charged to the selected members, was held to
constitute a "bribe" under Article 129.119
Under Article 2 of the special statutes against bribery, the
Supreme Court held that a series of payments made to an official
may be combined if the payments are part of the "same
scheme." 120 In State v. Lee,121 an official received a total of
seventeen payments by a corporate representative over the course
of eighteen months. 1 2 2 The Court held that the payments were
part of the "same scheme," and were not to be considered
Hence, the combined sum of the payments,
individually. 12 3
brought it within the provisions of the
which exceeded $64,000,
24
special statutes. 1
As for what constitutes a bribe, anything that confers a
physical or psychological benefit to an official, in exchange for a
public function, may fulfill this element under Article 129. The
content of a bribe may take almost any shape, size, or form, as
long as it confers some type of benefit. As in Chung, the mere
expectation that the value of a company's shares could rise was
sufficient to render the shares a bribe. Among the elements of the
bribery offense under Article 129, this element is the broadest in
scope.
3. Duty
If an act is a public duty, it will fall within the purview of the
antibribery statutes. A large body of Korean case law defines the

scope of the phrase "public duty." A public official violates Article
129 if he receives, demands, or promises to accept a bribe "in
connection with his duties." 1 25 The Korean Supreme Court has
broadly interpreted the range of a public official's "duties." In
State v. Koh, 1 2 6 the Court held that an act is within the scope of
public duty if it is "influential," apart from duties expressly
if the public official lacks the
prescribed by statute, even
"authority to deliver the act. " 1 2 7

119. Id. at48.
Judgment of Sept. 25, 1990 (State v. Lee), Daebubwon [Supreme
120.
Court], 90 do 1588 Daepahn 261 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by
author).
121. Id.
Id.at 262.
122.
123. Id.
124. Id.
KoREAN LAws, supranote 71, at 779.
125.
Judgment of Dec. 28, 1956, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 4289
126.
hyungsang 235 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
127.
Id.
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In Koh, the defendant was a police officer in charge of
screening applications for exemptions from the military draft and
sending them to the mayor. 128 The mayor made the sole decision
as to which applicants would qualify for exemption. An applicant
sought to secure exemption from the draft and gave money to the
defendant along with the application. The defendant was found to
lack the authority to make the final decision concerning
exemption from the military draft. 12 9 The Court, however, found
that the defendant possessed the capacity to "influence" the
decision by virtue of his ability to screen the applications. 30 The
Court held that such influential capacity brought the defendant's
act within the scope of public duty regarding the antibribery
provisions.131
In a later decision, the Court held that the scope of duty
under Article 129 includes acts that are "closely related" to
express statutory duties. 13 2 For example, in State v. Chol,133 a
low-level public official, employed by a local construction bureau,
received a payment from a private construction company
representative. 1 3 4 As an employee of the bureau, the public
official's responsibilities included surveying government-owned
land parcels for zoning purposes. The local construction bureau
collected all offers made concerning government-owned land
parcels and sent them to an appraiser. The appraiser would later
select and accept the offer that was closest to the assessed
market price of the parcel.
The construction company representative made the payment
to the official in exchange for an estimate on the assessed market
price of the parcel. The representative sought to make an offer in
accordance with the official's estimate in order to increase the

chances that the offer would be accepted.

On these facts, the

Court found that the official's estimation of the parcel's value was
not "closely related" to his prescribed duties. 135 The official's
estimate was found to be based on his own personal knowledge
136
and experience, apart from his duty to survey land parcels.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 236.
130. Id. at 236-37.
131.
Id. at 238.
132. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1961, Daebubwon [Supreme Court), 4294
hyungsang 292 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
133. Judgment of Mar. 22, 1983, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 82 do 1922
Daepahn 76 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
134. Id. at 77.
135. Id. at 78.
136. Id.
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Thus, the official's acceptance of the payment was held not to be
137
"in connection with his duties."

The Court also held that public duties embody acts that are
established through "actual practice." 138 In State v. Koh, 13 9 the
Court elaborated upon this rule and held that public duties
include acts that are performed under a public official's defacto
authority.1 4 0 In Koh, the defendant was a colonel in the army
who received a series of small payments from a subordinatecaptain in exchange for favorable assignments. 14 1 The Court
found that the subordinate-captain had made his request in light
of the defendant's position of authority. 142 Apart from de Jure
authority, expressed by statute, the Court held that the
defendant's de facto authority was sufficient to bring his action
within the range of public duty, especially in light of the power of
his rank within the military.

14 3

In State v. Shin,14 4 the Court held that public duties also
encompass acts that are "governed by a statutory requirement of
the administrative agency under whose authority the official is
acting."'14 5 In Shin, the defendant was employed by a local rural
development bureau, an agency responsible for approving
The defendant received a
government landfill projects.' 46
payment from a representative of a private construction company,
the latter seeking to obtain approval for a project completed by
the construction company. The defendant contended that the
payment was not accepted "in connection with his duties," since
he was employed within the agricultural creation division, and not
the agricultural development division which directly oversaw all

landfill projects. The Court held that although the defendant had
an indirect role in the approval of such projects, his decisions
were nevertheless "governed by the statutory guidelines of the

local rural development bureau, under whose authority the

137. Id.
138. Judgment of Nov. 22, 1966, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 66 do 1378
(Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
139.
Judgment of June 7, 1977, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 76 do 3662
Daepahn 35, 38 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
140.
Id. at 38.
141. Id. at 36-37.
142. Id. at 38.
143. Id.
144. Judgment of Sept. 25, 1984, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 84 do 1568
Daepahn 191 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
145. Id. at 193.
146. Id.
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defendant was acting."1 4 7 Thus, the defendant was held to accept
148
the payment "in connection with his duties."
The Korean Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the scope
of a public official's duties under Article 129. Apart from duties
prescribed by statute, public duty may be implied when an act is
influential, even if the public official has no authority to deliver
the act. In addition, the scope of public duty includes acts that
are closely related to express statutory duties, established
through actual practice, performed under de facto authority, or
governed by statute of an administrative agency under whose
authority a public official is acting. Any one of these factors may
be dispositive of the issue as to whether an act falls within the
broad scope of public duty outlined by the Korean Supreme
Court.
4. Intent
Under Article 129, specific criminal intent must be
14 9
established in order to sustain a conviction. In State v. Gwok,
the Korean Supreme Court held that a public official is in
violation of the antibribery statutes if the official "knowingly"
receives, demands, or promises to accept a bribe with the "intent
to perform an official action in exchange for the bribe."15 0 The
bribe must be offered in exchange for specific official action, or
quid pro quo.' 5 1
The requisite intent may be proven by
circumstantial evidence in light of all of the facts and
152
circumstances of each case.
In Gwok, a construction company representative was in

charge of the administration of a random lottery selection
process, which granted each selected participant a unit within a
newly constructed condominium complex.' 5 3 The representative
was a personal friend of a local government official and arranged
for the official to be selected for the acquisition of a condominium

147. Id.
148.
Id. at 194.
149.
Judgment of Apr. 28, 1981, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 80 do 3323
Daepahn 337, 342 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by author).
150. Id.

151.

Id.

152. Id. See also Judgment of Mar. 4, 1955 (State v. Yoo), Daebubwon
[Supreme Court], 4285 hyungsang 114 (Korea) (the monetary amount of a bribe
was held to be a factor in determining whether the defendant-official had the
intent to participate in an illicit exchange) (Korean language only, translated by
author).
153.
Judgment of Apr. 28, 1981, 80 do 3323 Daepahn at 339.

BRIBERY AMONG THE KOREAN ELITE

19961

1095

unit. 1 5 4

The Court held that the public official was not in
violation of Article 129 because the unit was not received in
exchange for any specific official action. 15 5 In the absence of a
specific quid pro quo arrangement,
the Court held that the intent
15 6
requirement was not satisfied.
When a public official "receives" a bribe, the official must
have "knowledge or awareness" of the bribe's existence.
For
example, a public official was unaware that someone had left an
envelope filled with money in his office. 15 7
The official
immediately returned the money to the donor after discovering
the payment. 158 The Court held that the official did not "receive"
a bribe, since he was not "aware" of the payment when it was
offered by the donor. 15 9 Thus, the official lacked the requisite
state of mind under Article 129.160 In another case, as a public
official was leaving in a limousine, the donor threw a package of
money through the open window of the moving vehicle. 16 1 Under

these facts, the Court held that the official did not "knowingly
162
receive" a bribe, thus negating the element of intent.
The element of intent is of particular significance in the sense
that it is reflected through a quid pro quo arrangement. Judge
John Noonan distinguishes between a gift, a campaign
contribution, and a bribe from the moral perspective. His views
offer guidance in the present context since moral parameters
shape the legal parameters concerning bribery. 163
Noonan
observes:

A gift... is meant as an expression of personal affection, of some
degree of love.... No obligation is imposed which the donee must
fulfill. . . . That the gift should operate coercively is indeed
repugnant and painful to the donor, destructive of the liberality
that is intended. Freely given, the gift leaves the donee free....
Campaign contributions are imperfect gifts because they are

154. Id.
155. Id. at 342.
156. Id.
157.
Judgment of Jan. 31, 1978, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 77 do 3755
Chongnam Hyungbup 129-64 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by
author).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. See also Judgment of Nov. 25, 1986, Daebubwon [Supreme Court],
86 do 1433 Daepahn 69 (Korea) (when a public official "receives" a bribe, the
official need not independently demand or promise to accept a bribe for the
element of intent to be established) (Korean language only, translated by author).
161.
Judgment of July 10, 1979, Daebubwon [Supreme Court], 79 do 1124
Chongnam Hyungbup 129-73 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated by

author).
162.
163.

Id.
See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
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usually not set in a context of personal relations; they are intended
to express a limited love-an identification with a cause.... They
do not express or create overriding obligations, that is, there is no
absolute obligation on the part of the contributor to recognize past
work by the candidate; and there is no absolute obligation on the
part of the candidate to do the work the contributor expects.
Absence of absolute obligation creates one difference between
contributions and bribes. Size is thus a relevant characteristic. A
large contribution can create an overriding obligation; its proper
16 4
name becomes a bribe.

A gift or a campaign contribution is thus lawful when it does not
create an obligation on the part of the public official to reciprocate
to the donor. The donor gives, and the donee receives, without
the expectation that the latter will specifically perform a public
function on behalf of the former. There is no exchange.
However, when a specific quid pro quo arrangement can be
implied, the contribution constitutes a bribe. The size of a
contribution is a factor to be considered in determining whether
there is an illicit exchange. For example, in the hypothetical case
of the corporate political contribution for one million dollars posed
earlier, the public official receiving such a large sum may have an
overriding obligation to reciprocate through official action. Given
the large amount of the contribution, one is more likely to infer
that a bribe exists than if the amount of the contribution was
relatively small.
The size of a contribution, or the timely
performance of a specific public function by an official, are factors
that may establish the requisite intent.
The determination of the predominant motive, or intent, is
ultimately decisive as to whether a contribution was meant to
manipulate a public official. 16 5 Noonan elaborates, "Motives may
be mixed when the President makes an appointment or when a
private corporation hires a former government employee. Double
effect can often be found-choice of a responsible appointee,
reciprocation of an official favor. As in countless other situations
of double effect, a moral judgment is required to determine the
predominant motive and consequences.' 166 Hence, an official's
intent to reciprocate a specific public function, in exchange for a
benefit, lies at the heart of the bribery offense.

164. NOONAN, supra note 77, at 695-97. Apart from size, Noonan notes that
the public disclosure of contributions is another way contributions differ from
bribes. Id. at 697. Contributions are given openly, recorded, and reported. Such
disclosure preserves political accountability. Id. However, the characteristic of
non-secrecy loses some significance in the current context, since many political
contributions were made openly to former Korean Presidents through political
slush funds. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
165. NOONAN,supra note 77, at 698.
166. Id.
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As noted above, the Korean case law construing the element
of intent focuses on the existence of a quid pro quo
arrangement. 167
The size of a suspected bribe and the
performance of a public function are among numerous factors
that may establish the requisite element of intent. Whether such
16 8
If
factors exist are questions of fact to be tried by the court.
the evidence establishes a quid pro quo arrangement beyond a
reasonable doubt, the mental state requirement is satisfied. 169 In
this regard, the Korean antibribery statutes and case law seem to
provide a satisfactory and workable legal framework in terms of
defining the parameters of the bribery offense.
An overall evaluation of the laws against bribery reveals that
they are broad in scope, with the element of intent being
significant in distinguishing between lawful and unlawful

exchanges.

In a 1984 decision, the Korean Supreme Court

stated, "In order to maintain public confidence in the government,
the purpose of the antibribery laws is to preserve fairness in the
execution of public service and to protect the principle that public
service cannot be bought.' 170 The broad judicial construction of
Article 129 reflects the Court's pursuit of such policy goals to
maintain the integrity of public office.
Given that the Korean laws against bribery are sufficiently
broad in scope, one may question why bribery remains pervasive
among public officials. The problem does not arise from the laws
themselves. As noted above, the substantive content of the
antibribery laws seems satisfactory and a revision of the laws is
largely unnecessary. 1 7 1 Instead, the practice of bribery has
continued largely as a result of the inconsistent enforcement of
the antibribery laws.
B. The PoorEnforcement of the Antibribery Laws
The enforcement of the antibribery laws has largely been
limited to low-level public officials within both the central and
local sectors of the government. High-level officials within the
central government include, but are not limited to, the following:

167.

See supranotes 149-162 and accompanying text.

168.
See supra note 94.
169.
Determinations as to whether the requisite intent exists can only be
made on a case-by-case basis in light of all relevant facts and circumstances.
170.
Judgment of Sept. 25, 1984 (State v. Shin), Daebutwon [Supreme
Court], 84 do 1568 Daepahn 191, 193 (Korea) (Korean language only, translated
by author).

171. The only revision necessary is an amendment to the Korean
Constitution which is discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 216-233

and accompanying text.
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the President, the Prime Minister, ministry officials above the level
of the Assistant Minister, and members of the ruling party of the
National Assembly. 172
High-level officials within the local
government include governors, vice-governors, mayors, and vicemayors. 173 The majority of cases have not implicated such highlevel officials and the antibribery laws have been primarily
enforced against
officials at lower levels within the political
74
hierarchy.'
As a result of an overpowering executive branch, which
exercised broad discretion during the successive military regimes,
175
a strong disparity exists between legal theory and reality.
Although the Korean Constitution provides for fairness and equal
application of the laws, 176 in reality the antibribery laws have not
been enforced against high-level officials. Possessed as they were
of tremendous political authority, high-level officials, especially
within the central government, engaged in bribery without fear of

legal action. 177 Despite the capacity to pursue legal action, public
prosecutors largely chose not to prosecute high-level officials

172. See KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 255-56.
173. Id. at 251-53.
174. Apart from journalistic sources, this observation is based on a review
of all Supreme Court and high court decisions involving the bribery offense
concerning public officials, under both the general and special statutes, rendered
between 1953 and 1995. The vast majority of these decisions involve only lowlevel public officials. Of course, such an observation does not presume that those
high-level officials suspected of bribery are guilty of the offense in the absence of
any legal conviction. Under Korean law, all suspects are presumed innocent until
proven guilty in a court of law. See supra note 94.
175. As for the separation of powers among the three branches of
government, one scholar observes that the executive branch exercised broad
discretionary power.
See Dae-Kyu Yoon, New Developments in Korean
Constitutionalism Changes and Prospects, 4 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 395, 404
(1995). In the past, the legislative and judicial branches of government assumed
passive roles amidst an overpowering executive branch. Id. At times when the
President sought an additional presidential term, the National Assembly provided
support. Id. The judiciary remained largely passive throughout the entire period,
with the power of judicial review shifting between the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Committee, and the Constitutional Court over the course of several
decades. Id. at 406-10. Yoon states:
In Korea, the long period of authoritarian governance inevitably distorted
the will of the public and the law to fit the political purposes of the
moment.
Administrative expediency and efficiency were unduly
emphasized while fairness and procedure were neglected. .

.

. What

aggravated the situation in Korea was the fact that nominally
countervailing institutions, such as the legislature and Judiciary, were too
weak to curb the vast discretionary power enjoyed by the executive.
Id. at 410-11.

176.

See KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 4-5.

177.

See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
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through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In particular,
prosecutors remained reluctant to challenge the power of the chief
executive while the military-backed authoritarian regimes
maintained control of the government.
Such inconsistent
enforcement of the antibribery laws greatly weakened the efforts
in policing government corruption and allowed bribery to spread
among many public officials.
The cases involving low-level officials reflect only a small
portion of the overall problem of bribery among officials in
general. Even with the transition to a legitimate democracy under
the current leadership, allowing for the prosecution of two former
Presidents, the pervasive corruption among officials has left
prosecutors with insufficient resources to pursue all cases of
bribery. Therefore, one should not take the antibribery laws at
face value. In placing the antibribery laws in proper perspective,
one can identify solutions to address their ineffective
enforcement.
IV. A

MODEL FOR EFFICIENT ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTIBRIBERY LAWS:
THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT THEORY

Although President Kim's efforts have set the stage for future
reforms, the question remains as to how to redress the persisting
problem of government corruption.
Scholars adopting an
economic approach to criminal law have provided insight
regarding efficient means of criminal law enforcement through
what is referred to as the optimal enforcement theory. The
optimal enforcement theory seeks to ascertain economically
efficient, or optimal, levels of criminal law enforcement efforts in
order to minimize the overall costs of crime and punishment to
society. 178 Through an analysis of the optimal enforcement
theory, principles of the theory can be applied to the present
context. In the process, one can develop proposals as to how to
enforce the Korean antibribery laws efficiently in order to decrease
the incidence of bribery among public officials.
Gary Becker championed the classic model of optimal law
enforcement. 17 9 The analysis begins with the individual offender,
178. See Infra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
179. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment- An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Becker's work subsequently generated many other works
discussing different aspects of the optimal enforcement theory. See, e.g., Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1193,

1205-31

(1985) (offering an economic perspective, focused on promoting

efficiency, regarding the substantive doctrines of criminal law); RIcHARD A.
POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIs OF LAw 223-31 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing optimal
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who either chooses to obey or to violate the law. The offender will

commit an offense if the social value of the gain to the offender
(denoted by variable G) exceeds the cost of the expected penalty,
which relates to the probability of conviction (denoted by variable
p) and the level of punishment (denoted by variablef ).180 Thus,

in symbolic terms, the offender connits the crime when
pf.

181

G >

An increase in either p or f would decrease the expected
utility from an offense and would reduce the number of offenses,
since either the probability of being convicted or the level of
punishment itself would increase. 18 2 The variable H refers to the

external harm caused by the offense to other members of

society. 183 The net cost or damage to society, denoted by the
variable D, equals the difference between H and G. 18 4
The
variable 0 is also introduced in order to determine the aggregate

effects18 5of the total number of offenses, and thus: D(O) = H(O) G(O).
Under the optimal enforcement theory, one must also take
into account the costs of law enforcement which come in two
forms. First, the cost of apprehension and conviction exists in
terms of expenditures spent on police, court personnel, and other
specialized equipment used for law enforcement (such as wire-

criminal sanctions); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysts of the
Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L,J. 1, 24-37 (providing
an economic analysis of criminal law as shaping the preferences of offenders and
the population at large); Jason S. Johnston, PunitiveLiability: A New Paradigmof
Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385, 1395-98 (1987) (discussing
optimal punitive liability in the civil tort law context and arguing that efficiency
can be achieved by: (1) raising the burden of proof from negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence to gross negligence by clear and convincing
evidence; (2) lowering the standard of care to require less than reasonable care;
and (3) assessing punitive damages).
180. Becker, supra note 179, at 173, 176-77.
181. See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea. 79 VA. L. REV. 741,
749-50 (1993).
182. Becker, supra note 179, at 177.
183. Id. at 173.
184. Id. The net cost or damage to society includes costs caused by the
entire range of criminal offenses, which give rise to estimates of direct costs of
various crimes. Id. at 170. Costs are Incurred in terms of crimes against
persons, crimes against property, illegal consumption of goods, and white-collar
crimes. Id. at 171. There are also the costs of public expenditures in enforcing
the law, as well as private expenditures spent on precautions taken against

crime. Id.
185. Id. at 173, 177. The notations within the equation are read "D as a
function of 0," and so forth for the other variables, signifying that the value of D
in the aggregate depends on the value of 0, the number of offenses. See Parker,
supra note 181, at 750 n.22.

19961

1101

BRIBERY AMONG THE KOREAN ELITE

l
tapping, computer monitoring, and fingerprinting).'

6

Such

expenditures are denoted by the variable C, which is a function of
both the "supply" of offenses 0, and the probability of conviction
p, and is labeled as C(p, 0).187 An increase in either the
probability of apprehension and conviction, or the number of
Second,
offenses, would thus increase the total cost.' 8 8
punishments are costly to offenders in terms of foregone earnings,
the value of the restrictions in consumption and freedom, and
fines paid.' 8 9 There is also the cost of punishments to other

members of society such as expenditures spent on prison guards,

supervisory personnel, buildings, and food. 19 0 The total social
cost of punishments is the cost to offenders plus the cost or
minus the gain to others. 19 1
Some punishments also create a "deadweight" loss to society,
denoted as the factor b, to the degree that the punishment
imposed on the offender cannot be transferred to socially
productive use. 19 2 The total social loss from punishments can
thus be expressed as bpfO, since bf represents the loss per
193
offense punished, and pO is the number of offenses punished.
As with an increase in the probability of conviction, an increase in
punishments also raises the total level of social cost.
Putting all of the foregoing variables together, Becker's model
defines the total social loss function according to the following
equation: L = D(O) + C(p, 0) + bpfO.19 4 Under this equation, the
total social loss (denoted by variable L) from crime and
punishment equals the sum of the net cost to society, the cost of
apprehension and conviction, and the cost of punishments. The
important task consists of selecting values for the variables that
are directly subject to social control in order to minimize the total
social loss. Becker designates p and f, which refer to the
probability of conviction and the level of punishment respectively,
as the social decision variables. 195 By adjusting these decision
variables and observing how they affect the level of total social

186. Becker, supra note 179, at 174.
187. Id. at 174-77.
188. Id. at 175.
189. Id. at 179.
190. Id. at 180.
191. Id. Costs to offenders regarding fines paid produce a gain to others
that equal the cost to offenders, apart from collection costs, and thus the social
cost of fines is close to zero. Id. The payment of a fine is essentially a transfer
payment. Id.
192. Parker, supranote 181, at 750.

193.

Becker, supra note 179, at 181.

194.
195.

Id.
Id.
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loss, one can ascertain optimality conditions for p andf. Optimal
enforcement is achieved at the point where the marginal benefit
and the marginal cost are equal, and the total social loss is
19 6
minimized.
Optimality is
compromised
in
conditions
of either
underdeterrence or overdeterrence.' 97 In order to achieve optimal
deterrence, the external harm must equal the expected penalty
from a societal perspective.' 98
Underdeterrence occurs if the
external harm exceeds the expected penalty, which would cause
society to lose from both the commission of the offense and the
ensuing need to punish the offender. 199 If the expected penalty
exceeds the external harm, overdeterrence occurs when a welfareincreasing act is deterred. 20 0
In this situation, preventive

measures may deter acts whose benefits outweigh their social

costs, resulting in overcompliance
among those who refrain from
20 1
productive behavior.

196. Id. at 181-85. Becker notes that if the goals of social policy were
simply deterrence, the probability of conviction p could be raised close to one, and
punishments f could be imposed to exceed the gain, thereby allowing for a
reduction in the number of offenses 0 essentially at will. Id. at 180. However, an
increase in p increases the social cost of offenses in raising expenditures In
fighting crime C, as does an increase inf (if b > 0) due to the cost of punishments
bf. Id. At modest levels ofp andf, such effects may outweigh the social gain from
increased deterrence. Likewise, if social policy simply were to make punishment
to proportionately fit the crime, p could be set close to one, and f could be
equated to the harm incurred by the rest of society. Id. at 180-81. Such a policy,
however, also neglects the social cost of increases iap andf. Id. at 181.
As for the dynamics between p andf, Becker observes that an increase In p
would reduce the expected utility, and thus the number of offenses, more than an
equal percentage increase inf if the offender has preference for risk; an increase
inf would have the greater effect if the offender has aversion to risk; and p andf
would have the same effect if the offender is risk-neutral. Id. at 178.
197. Parker, supra note 181, at 757-58. Under Parker's analysis, p is held
constant andf is assumed to be the sole decision variable. Id. at 751-53.
198. Becker, supra note 179, at 183.
199. Parker, supra note 181, at 757-58.
200. Id. at 757.
201. Id. at 772. Jeffrey Parker rounds out Becker's model and incorporates
the doctrine of mens rea into the optimal enforcement theory. Id. at 769-77.
Parker first acknowledges both descriptive and normative criticisms of the optimal
enforcement theory. From a descriptive perspective, the theory is criticized for
being impractical in terms of its application. There are inherent difficulties in
measuring variables such as the social harm of an offense, the probability of
detection, and the responsiveness of potential offenders to punishment. Id. at
743. Normatively speaking, critics argue that the optimal enforcement theory
fails to account for the moral dimension of criminal law, as exemplified by the
theory of retribution and its emphasis on moral blameworthiness. Id. at 743-44.
By incorporating the doctrine of merzs rea into the optimal enforcement theory,
however, Parker responds to both of the foregoing criticisms.
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In applying the tenets of the optimal enforcement theory to
the present context, one can derive prescriptions for policy to
address the problem of government corruption. Various solutions
can be proposed to decrease the incidence of bribery among
public officials through efficient enforcement of the Korean
antibribery laws.

Parker refers to mens rea as a requirement of self-awareness, or the
possession of "self-characterizlng" information, denoted by the variable I. Id. at
744-45. In economic terms, whether the actor is aware of the nature of the
committed act refers to the actor's information costs at the margin. Id. at 745. If
the actor did not know the relevant circumstances, then it would have been costly
for the actor to acquire that information (I > 0). Id. If the actor did know, it would
have been costless to obtain the necessary information (I = 0). Id. In other words,
if the environment has provided the actor with the necessary information ex ante,

then the actor did not have to invest in self-characterization, in which case I is
zero and mens rea exists. Id. at 779. Apart from the cost of acquiring such
information, one may also incur the private cost of overinvesting in information in
order to comply with the law whenever punitive penalties exist. Id. at 773-75.
As Parker argues, the mens rea doctrine serves the economic function of
Id. at 745-46. Parker initially
minimizing the cost of self-characterization.
simplifies Becker's model by holding p constant and designatingf as the sole
decision variable. Id. at 751-53. In the situation where it is difficult to precisely
measure the external cost of criminal behavior, causing penalties to be set at
punitive levels above the optimal range, mens rea serves to reduce expected
punishment costs to zero whenever self-characterization is costly (when I > 0, and
the actor does not have the requisite mental state). Id. at 776. Parker provides
his own equation reflecting this proposition and outlines conditions under which
the equation will be socially optimal. Id. In the process, Parker addresses both
descriptive and normative criticisms of the optimal enforcement theory. In
instances when it is difficult to accurately measure the variables of the theory,
Parker's model allows the public authority to raise punishment levels slightly
above the optimal level, while still avoiding the negative consequences associated
Also, by incorporating the mens rea doctrine into the
with overdeterrence.
optimal enforcement theory, Parker accounts for the moral element in criminal
law. Id. at 778-79.
One may justify the punishment of offenders based on moral grounds alone
according to the principles of retribution. However, the optimal enforcement
theory, premised on utilitarian principles, provides an analytical framework from
which one can derive policy solutions regarding criminal law enforcement. See
infra notes 202-244 and accompanying text. Inherent difficulties in measuring
variables (such as the social harm from an offense) do not detract from the
practical value of the optimal enforcement theory, as the practice of law itself Is
an inexact science.
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V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

A. Optimal Enforcement of the Antlbrlbery Laws
If national policy objectives seek to attain a sound democratic

form of government, one must address the problem of bribery
among public officials. Public officials must act accountably on
behalf of the people. A bribe taken for an official's personal gain
directly undermines the democratic process and sacrifices the
loyalty owed to the citizenry at the expense of the public welfare.
Reforms must achieve a government of integrity if Korea seeks to
continue its national development.
One readily identifiable
solution calls for optimal enforcement of the antibribery laws.
At the outset, it is safe to assume that the external harm to
Korean society presently exceeds the cost of preventive measures
because of widespread corruption among public officials. As a
result of this underdeterrence, the cost to society has been
incurred through a myriad of factors. Such factors include the
loss of many lives from the collapse of poorly constructed
infrastructures and a feeling of distrust towards the government
by the people. 20 2 In examining the two variables p and f (the
probability of conviction and the level of punishment), one must
approximate optimal values for these respective measures to
achieve efficient enforcement of the antibribery laws.
Under Article 129, Subsection (1), of the general statutes, the
punishment for bribery includes imprisonment for up to five
years. 20 3 Under Article 2, Subsection (1), of the special statutes,
the punishment for bribery (involving a sum exceeding $64,000) is
imprisonment from ten years to life. 20 4 Initially, one must
evaluate whether the levels of punishment for the bribery offense

202. See supra notes 10-26, 47-48 and accompanying text.
One
commentator notes that it Is incorrect to assume that corruption creates costs
and market inefficiencies without any counterbalancing economic benefits. John
Hogarth, Bribery of Officials in Pursuit of CorporateAims, 6 CRIM. L.F. 557, 559
(1995). For instance, the underground economy can stimulate economic growth
by responding to market demand for products or services not legally available. Id.
at 559. The underground economy may also provide a source of venture capital,
employ otherwise unemployable persons, and bring business expertise to highrisk ventures. Id. Despite such short-term economic benefits, however,
corruption among officials ultimately creates long-term economic and social costs
that outweigh the short-term benefits. Id. Such costs include increases in the
cost of government arising from noncompetitive bidding on government contracts,
nonproductive use of money for bribes, loss of tax revenues, and the erosion of

the free market. Id.
203.
204.

See supra note 91.
See supra note 93.
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are presently sufficient under the general and special statutes.
When the probability of conviction is below the optimal level, the
level of punishment can be increased to compensate for the lower
p to induce the optimal number of offenses. 205 However, if the
probability of conviction is too low, it may become impossible to
deter the offense of bribery despite imposing punitive levels of
punishment such as life imprisonment or even the death
penalty. 20 6 In such a situation, raising the level of punishment
becomes ineffective. Instead, the probability of conviction must
be increased in order to approach optimal deterrence.
Here, it appears that the punishment available under the
special statutes would potentially allow one to impose an optimal

level of punishment, which can be set at the court's discretion. A
sentence ranging from imprisonment for ten years to
imprisonment for life would intuitively constitute sufficient
punishment for bribery. Life imprisonment is clearly the highest
level of punishment possible (apart from the death penalty), and
any sentence approaching this extreme would be punitive. It
appears that the wide range of sentencing options currently
available under the special statutes is not the source of the
present problem of underdeterrence. As for the general statutes,
it will be assumed that the available penalty of up to five years in
prison would allow the court to set the degree of punishment at
the optimal level for smaller cases of bribery. In brief, the levels

205.
Becker, supra note 179, at 183.
206.
See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent,85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1241-44 (1985). Shavell notes
that an offender could not possibly be deterred from committing an act if his
expected private gain exceeds the disutility of the highest conceivable expected
punishment, the death penalty, discounted by the probability of its imposition.
Id. at 1241. As an example, Shavell describes a situation where the benefit an
offender would derive from committing an act is 200, the disutility of the
maximum punishment is 1000, and the probability of the imposition of
punishment is 10%. Id. at 1241 n.37. In this situation, the offender could not
possibly be deterred since the maximum expected punishment would be 10% x

1000, or 100, which is below 200. The foregoing situation relies on the formal
assumption that the disutility of punishments is bounded and not infinite. Id.
In addition, if the levels of punishment are raised very high in order to achieve
adequate deterrence, amidst a very low probability of conviction, the punishments
for acts of differing severity would be similar and thus compromise marginal
deterrence. Id. at 1246. Shavell describes that if the probability of apprehension
and conviction were very low, the punishments for both robbery and murder
might have to be near life imprisonment to create sufficient deterrence. Id. at
1246 n.52.
Under such circumstances, only a small difference in the
punishments for the two crimes would exist and robbers would have little reason
not to murder their victims. Id.
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the general and special
of punishment presently available under
20 7
changes.
any
warrant
not
do
statutes
The probability of apprehension and conviction (expressed as
p) emerges as the critical variable that must be manipulated to
achieve efficiency. As stated earlier, the antibribery laws have
been primarily enforced against low-level officials, pointing to only
a small segment of the overall problem of government corruption.
Even without empirical data, one may deduce that the value of p

in the present context is close to zero, particularly among highlevel officials, and below the optimal level. The present task is to
raise the probability of conviction of public officials that commit
bribery in order to enforce the antibribery laws optimally. A
higher probability of conviction would decrease the expected gain
from resorting to bribery, for the official contemplating the act,
and would reduce the aggregate number of bribery offenses
among officials. In turn, the lower incidence of bribery would
decrease the level of external harm to society and would diminish
the total social loss.
In order to raise the likelihood of apprehension and
conviction of public officials who commit bribery, the burden will
be on public prosecutors and law enforcement officials to enforce
the antibribery laws vigorously. However, one must keep in mind
that an increase in the probability of apprehension and conviction
raises the social cost of offenses by raising the expenditures
related to law enforcement. 20 8 It would be inefficient to prosecute
every instance of suspected bribery, especially in light of its
pervasiveness, to the point whereby the cost of law enforcement
exceeds the external harm to society. The cost of preventive
measures should thus be minimized by pursuing relatively larger
cases of bribery under the special statutes, involving sums over

207. The only concern points to the possibility of the level of imposed
punishment being reduced by a presidential pardon or commutation. Under the
Korean Constitution, the President has the power to grant "amnesty,
commutation, and restoration of rights." KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 14. For
instance, a reduction in Roh's sentence, which may occur in the future according
to some legal experts, could compromise optimal deterrence. See supra note 5.
In addition, monetary sanctions, in the form of fines, may be preferable to

imprisonment in deterring white-collar crime (such as corruption of public
officials) since they are less costly. See supra note 191; Richard A, Posner,
Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals. 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 410-18
(1980) (arguing that fines are a more efficient form of punishment than
However, as Posner
imprisonment with respect to white-collar criminals).

acknowledges, such a proposition only holds true to the extent that the whitecollar criminal is able to pay an imposed fine. See Id. at 417. See also Shavell,
supra note 206, at 1237. "[Ilt is impossible to deter a person with no assets by
the threat of monetary sanctions." Id.
208.

See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
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the statutory amount, in order to attain optimal enforcement.
Such action would allow the public authorities to use their
budgets and resources efficiently.
Optimal enforcement can be achieved by pursuing relatively
larger cases of bribery among high-level officials, particularly in

light of the social characteristics of the Korean culture. As noted
above, the Korean culture emphasizes the concept of one's
reputation and honor. 20 9 According to one's position within the
pyramid-structured social hierarchy, a higher level of deference is
given to those with higher status. In a society that focuses on
authority and status, the criminal punishment of prominent
political figures would have a greater deterrent effect, relative to
the punishment of low-level officials, because of the larger social
stigma associated with such punishment. 2 10 The conviction and
punishment of high-level officials would thus have a deterrent
effect comparable to punishing a larger number of low-level
officials. Since a relatively lesser number of officials would need
to be apprehended and punished to achieve the same deterrent
effect, one can efficiently minimize the cost of preventive
measures.
In addition, scholars observe that the effects of deterrence
vary among different social subgroups of the general
population. 2 1 1 For instance, the process of socialization has been
identified as a variable related to criminal behavior. 2 12 A strongly
socialized person is more likely to comply with the threat of
punishment due to a greater sensitivity to the negative aspects of
punishment than the less socialized counterpart. 2 13 Since public

209.

See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.

210.

See Posner, supranote 179, at 1205.

211. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 249-53
(1973).
212. Id- at 119.
213. The optimal enforcement theory assumes that criminal acts are based
upon rational, cost-benefit analyses by wrongdoers.
Although such an

assumption may not hold true for those who are insane, mentally incompetent, or
uneducated, its predictive power comes into play when dealing with socialized
subgroups of the population. See Id. at 75 (citing Jeremy Bentham, Prlnclples of
Penal Law, 1 WoRKs 392, 399 (1843)).
Zimring and Hawkins observe:
[One reason for] law-abiding behavior [includes the factor that] the
strongly socialized individual will obey commands out of a desire to do
right, quite independent of the specific consequences of wrongdoing.
Further, a strongly socialized individual is more likely to comply with
threats because he is more sensitive to the negative aspects of threatened
consequences than his less socialized neighbor. Social disapproval, which
is an important part of most threatened consequences, will be carefully
avoided by the strongly socialized individual. Because the [two factors]
will commonly occur together, it Is extremely difficult to estimate how
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officials can be generally characterized as strongly socialized
individuals, 2 14 officials presumably share a greater sensitivity to
threatened consequences.

As a result of this greater sensitivity,

the threat of punishment is likely to have a larger deterrent effect

among officials with respect to bribery, compared to the effects of
punishment among less socialized individuals regarding other
crimes.
Such a larger deterrent effect would also promote

efficient enforcement of the antibribery laws through less costly
means of law enforcement.
Lastly, in raising the probability of conviction, one must
acknowledge the concern of overdeterrence. Apart from the cost
of higher expenditures on law enforcement, overdeterrence may
also chill socially productive behavior. As stated earlier, the

exchange of gifts is an integral aspect of the Korean culture in

terms of maintaining social relationships. 2 15 Imposing preventive
measures above the optimal level may cause people to refrain
from making such legal exchanges. Such overdeterrence may

much of an observed difference between strongly and weakly socialized
individuals is attributable to the greater sensitivity of the former to the
negative aspects of threatened consequences. Perhaps the crucial test of
such an effect would come in an area covered by a legal threat where the
chances of apprehension were known to be nil ....
[or] extremely low.
Id. at 120.
These observations apply to the present context. One may initially assume
that public officials can be generally characterized as "strongly socialized," since
most officials are literate and educated. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEM OF KOREA 248 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983). All public officials who are to
serve in administrative agencies, above the level of Grade five, are required to
pass an examination. The examination consists of written, oral, and performance
tests which are designed to gauge the applicant's educational background. Id.
According to Zimring and Hawkins, the absence of bribery among strongly
socialized persons, such as public officials, could be attributed either to their

sense of morality or to their greater sensitivity to the negative aspects of
threatened consequences, compared to less socialized persons. If public officials
were to refrain from engaging in bribery, committed despite a low risk of
apprehension, then the officials presumably did not commit the criminal act
because of their sense of morality, as opposed to any deterrent effect of
punishment. Conversely, if public officials were to engage in bribery, amidst a
low chance of apprehension, one could eliminate the element of the "desire to do
the right thing" as a factor regarding compliant behavior.
The recent convictions of former Presidents Chun and Roh as well as other
former officials for bribery, committed during periods when the risk of
apprehension was extremely low, detract from the naive notion that public
officials would obey the laws against bribery through a commitment to moral
values, apart from the deterrent effects of punishment. Therefore, public officials
are more likely to comply with the threat of punishment, relative to less socialized
persons, due to a greater sensitivity to the negative aspects of threatened
consequences.
214. See supra note 213.
215. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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impede the process of reciprocation and hinder interpersonal
relationships. Hence, in achieving optimal enforcement of the
antibribery laws, an increase in the probability of conviction of
public officials must be tempered by the potentially negative
aspects of overdeterrence.
B. ConstitutionalAmendment-Taking Optimal Enforcement
All the Way
If the foregoing observations are to have any practical
significance, they must apply to the highest of all public officialsnamely, the President.
The pyramid-structured political
hierarchy places the President in a highly influential position in
light of cultural norms that stress social status, conformity, and
group harmony. The President controls the members of the State
Council which include the Prime Minister, ministers, and other
high-level officials.2 16 The President also directs
and supervises
2 17
the heads of all central administrative agencies.
One former public official's comments reveal that meaningful
change must occur from the top of the political hierarchy. In
some instances, bribery schemes operate within an entire
government agency.2 18 When an official receives a bribe, it is
often distributed among a network of supervisors and fellow
employees. 2 19 In such a situation, an ethical official who refuses
to accept a bribe risks being terminated. 220 Those at lower levels

of the bureaucratic hierarchy are sometimes almost forced to
accept bribes in order to maintain job security. Under these
circumstances, the only possible solution is to rectify the
situation from the top of the political structure. Meaningful
reform cannot occur unless officials in high positions, beginning
with the President, can provide an atmosphere for other officials
to act lawfully without the fear of reprisal.
The Korean
Constitution should be amended to this end.
Article 84 of the Korean Constitution provides, "The President
shall not be charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of
office except for insurrection or treason." 22 1
Although the

216.
217.
218.
MONTHLY,
author).
219.
220.
221.
applicable

See KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 15.
Id. at 255.
Young-Juhn Kahm, Confessions of a Former Tax Collector, CHOSUN
Sept. 1990, at 208, 210-11 (Korean language only, translated by
Id. at210.
Id. at 211.
KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 14-15. The statute of limitations for
offenses, apart from insurrection or treason, begins to toll upon
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President can be impeached for misdeeds committed while in
office, 2 22 the President cannot be criminally prosecuted for

bribery during the presidential term.

This grant of immunity

poses a problem since a motion for impeachment of the President
is unlikely to occur due to political reasons. 2 23 Even if the
antibribery laws are enforced against high-level officials of the
central government, the force of the laws may remain insufficient
if the President can engage in bribery without the threat of
impeachment or any criminal sanctions during the five-year
presidential term.
If efficient deterrence is to be a means for reform, the Korean
Constitution must be amended to include bribery within the
exception to the presidential immunity from criminal prosecution.
Although the procedural requirements may make a constitutional
amendment appear difficult to achieve, 2 24 many amendments
have been made in the past. 2 25 If subject to criminal prosecution
for bribery, the President will likely refrain from accepting illicit
payments during the presidential term. In turn, such changes
can permit the laws against bribery to be optimally enforced.

completion of the presidential term. See YOUNG-SUNG KwON. PRINCIPLES OF THE
CONSTITUTION 802, 802 n.2 (1988) (Korean language only, translated by author).
222. The President can be impeached for a violation of the Constitution or
"other laws in the performance of official duties" which include the antibribery
laws. KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 12.
223. See Infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
224. The procedures for a constitutional amendment are outlined In
Chapter X of the Korean Constitution. See KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 22. A
proposal to amend the Constitution can be introduced either by a majority of the
total members of the National Assembly or by the President. If passage by the
National Assembly by a two-thirds vote or more is obtained, the proposed
amendment is submitted to a national referendum within 30 days. More than
one-half of all votes cast in favor of the proposed amendment, by more than onehalf of all eligible voters, renders the amendment "finalized." Id. A proposed
amendment, subjecting the President to criminal prosecution for bribery
committed while in office, is likely to be finalized in a national referendum.
Reports of the widespread positive reaction to the convictions of Chun and Roh
suggest that the majority of the Korean population would support such an
amendment. See Wu Dunn. supranote 2, at A4.
225. See Yoon, supra note 175, at 400.
Yoon notes, "Since the
establishment of the first constitution in 1948, Korea has changed its
Constitution nine times, an average of almost once every five years. This alone
demonstrates the instability of Korea's political process. Moreover, until recently,
every change of regime has entailed a change in the Constitution." Id. For the
first time, the 1987 revision of the Constitution was a result of a collaborative
effort between the government and the opposition party. Id. at 402. The 1987
revision reinstated the direct popular vote as the process for presidential elections
and limited the presidential term to one five-year term. Id. at 402-03. See also
Dae-Kyu Yoon, Constitutional Change in Korea: Retrospect and Prospects, XXV
AsAN AFFAIRS 178-86 (June 1994).
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One may argue that the process of impeachment is sufficient
Given the
in terms of sanctioning the President for bribery. 22 6
impeachment process, it would be unnecessary to subject the
President to criminal prosecution to prevent the misuse of office.
An impeachment of the President that is highly publicized may

adequately deter other officials from bribery due to the social
stigma associated with the removal from office. Impeachment is
also less cosily since it does not require expenditures related to
However, the National
criminal conviction and punishment.
for impeachment of the
a
motion
sustain
Assembly is not likely to
a motion to impeach
for
requirements
President. The procedural

the President are more stringent than those applicable to other
public officials and pose a serious barrier to removing the
President for abuse of office. 22 7 In particular, the ruling party has
228

traditionally held majority control of the National Assembly. 2 2 9
the President serves as the head of the ruling party.

Moreover,

Under these circumstances, the ruling party is unlikely to support
a motion for impeachment of the President due to partisan
solidarity. As long as the ruling party maintains majority control,
it can effectively block a motion for impeachment of the President.

Therefore,

the process

of impeachment

is

an ineffective

2 30
mechanism in terms of sanctioning the President for bribery.
Thus, the criminal process provides an essential alternative to
impeachment in disciplining the President for engaging in bribery
while in office.

226. See supra note 222.
KoREAN LAws, supra note 71, at 12. A motion to impeach the President
227.
initially requires a proposal by a majority vote of the National Assembly, and
concurrent approval by two-thirds of its total members. Id. As for other public
officials, a motion for impeachment can be proposed by one-third or more of the
total members of the National Assembly, and requires a concurrent vote of a
majority of the total members of the National Assembly. Id. If a motion Is
approved, the Constitutional Court adjudicates the impeachment decision. Id. at
19. Impeachment of a public official does not extend further than removal from
public office and does not exempt the impeached official from civil or criminal
liability. Id. at 12.
228. Yoon, supra note 175, at 404-05. Yoon observes,
Apart from exceptionally brief periods in the early 1950s and at the end of
the 1980s, the ruling party has enjoyed majority control of the legislature.
Most Assemblymen of the ruling party are fully under the control of the
President, who is also the head of the party.... Often, in the past, a
ruling-party-controlled Assembly demonstrated extreme loyalty to the
President.
Idl
229.
230.

Id.
No President has been Impeached throughout Korea's political history.
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One may nevertheless question whether a constitutional
amendment is still necessary to address the problem of
government corruption. Under the current laws, the prosecution
of the President for bribery upon completion of the term may
sufficiently deter other public officials from engaging in bribery.
For instance, the recent convictions of former Presidents Chun
and Roh may sufficiently deter other public officials from
corruption. Indeed, the convictions of Chun and Roh are likely to
have a significant deterrent effect upon other officials. If the
President engages in bribery while in office, however, the long
delay of criminal prosecution until after the term is completed
would compromise optimal deterrence. Delayed prosecution in
such a situation simply fails to prevent the harmful consequences
of bribery throughout the presidential term. Unless the President
is swiftly punished for bribery committed while in office, it may be
too late to redress the damaging effects resulting from years of
prior government bribery. After completion of the presidential

term, any deterrent effect that punishment may have is also
lessened by the former President's loss of political power and
prestige. Hence, the Korean Constitution must be amended to
allow immediate action against the President for a betrayal of the
public trust.
On the other hand, subjecting the President to criminal
prosecution for bribery could dangerously interfere with the
President's performance of executive duties. The independence of
the President preserves political stability.
Political turmoil
increases the susceptibility of falling prey to a North Korean
invasion.
Such an argument is quite plausible.
The
independence of the chief executive is necessary to preserve
political stability and order.
Criminal prosecution would
obviously interfere with the performance of the President's duties.
However, the mere potential of being subject to criminal
prosecution for bribery would not intrude upon the independence
of the President. Engaging in bribery is simply not one of the
President's proper executive duties. A President who accepts
bribes should no longer be in office. In such an event, the
procedure for replacing the President comprises nothing more
than an ordinary presidential election.2 3 ' Therefore, criminally
proscribing bribery would not interfere with the lawful exercise of
the President's responsibilities.
Perhaps the only remaining concern is that the President
could be prosecuted, despite insufficient evidence, solely as a
231. KOREAN LAWS, supra note 71, at 13. If a vacancy occurs in the office of
the President, a presidential election is to be held within 60 days. Id. The Prime
Minister temporarily fills the vacancy until a new President Is elected. Id.
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means of making a political attack upon the President. For
instance, a motion for impeachment requires approval by a twothirds vote of the National Assembly. In contrast, an individual
prosecutor could conduct an investigation and initiate criminal
proceedings solely to harass the President. Such an abuse of the
criminal process for political ends is unlikely, however, since
public prosecutors are employees of the executive branch and are
appointed by the President. 2 3 2 Instead, the question is whether a
public prosecutor could prosecute the President without a conflict
of interest, or outside political pressure, that would impede upon
the prosecutor's independence.
If the President is subject to criminal sanctions while in
office, the public prosecutor would be able to pursue legal action
against the President with sufficient independence. Although the
President is involved in hiring public prosecutors, the President
lacks the power to terminate them. Under Article 37 of the Public
Prosecutor's Act, a public prosecutor can be dismissed or
suspended if the prosecutor is impeached, sustains a criminal
conviction resulting in imprisonment, or is subject to disciplinary
action. 23 3 A public prosecutor's job security is threatened only if
the prosecutor commits a wrongful act, which does not include
the pursuit of lawful criminal prosecution. Thus, Article 37 would
allow the public prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the
President for bribery with sufficient independence.
It is
unnecessary to adopt measures that would arrange for an outside

independent counsel to prosecute suspected criminal violations
implicating the President.
C. Higher Salariesfor Low-Level PublicEmployees
-A Necessary Corollary to Optimal Enforcement
Another aspect of reducing government corruption entails
raising the salaries for low-level public positions. One often-cited
explanation for bribery among local government officials points to
the low incomes of low-level public employees. The positions with
low income levels are generally within administrative agencies
and bureaucratic organizations. 23 4
Salaries for local civic
servants are reportedly very low and insufficient to support the
average household. 235 Such low salaries create the need for

232. Id. at 323-26.
233. Id. at 323-27.
234. See Tae-Hyun Yoo. A Research Study on the Problem of Tax Evasion in
Korea 71 (1989) (unpublished M. Econ. Thesis, Korea University) (Korean
language only, translated by author).
235. Id. at 71-72.
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public employees to supplement their income through the
acceptance of bribes.2 3 6 Here, the solution is simply to raise the
income levels for low-level public employees who receive
insufficient salaries. If salaries for public positions that warrant a
raise are sufficiently increased, such changes would reduce the
need among low-level public employees to resort to bribery out of
dire financial necessity.
One obstacle to increasing government salaries consists of
the difficulty in raising taxes in light of the anticipated opposition
from the people. There is also the opportunity cost of raising
income levels for many public positions, which must be justified
by the social gain of reducing the incidence of bribery among
public employees whose salaries are increased. Initially, there Is
no need to raise taxes in order to subsidize higher government
salaries. Given the preexisting problem of tax evasion, 2 37 raising
taxes would not generate significant tax revenues, as tax evaders
simply would not comply with higher rates.
Significant tax
revenues can only be generated by addressing the problem of tax
evasion.
Apart from bribery, tax evasion is also a serious problem in
Korea. Individuals employ various methods to evade taxes such
as failing to report capital gains from the transfer of property,

undervaluing reported assets, and extending private loans to
others at interest rates above the usury rate. 23 8 At the corporate
level, companies evade taxes by fraudulently under-reporting
income and maintaining funds unaccounted for on the books of
record. 23 9
Such practices give rise to a large underground
economy that is wholly unreported.
In the case of private loans, over $3 billion worth of these
loans are estimated to circulate each year. 24 0 The interest income
earned from such loans is not reported. Countless employees of
small and medium-sized businesses are not compensated through
a formal payroll system, resulting in a large amount of untaxed

236. Id. See also NOONAN. supra note 77. at 638-39.
237.
See Infra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
238. Yoo, supra note 234, at 77. See Jae-Kwon Jung, Importer of Foreign
Wines Finedfor Tax Evasion, CHOSUN DAILY, Sept. 16, 1995, at 4 (Korean language
only, translated by author). An importer of foreign wines was fined for using false
invoices and receipts in order to under-report the amount of goods imported and
distributed. Id. See also Sung-Uhng Moon, Theater Owner Investigatedfor Tax
Evasion, CHOSUN DAILY, Mar. 14, 1996, at 6 (Korean language only, translated by

author). A theater owner was fined for reusing movie tickets, without destroying
them after each purchase, in order to conceal under-reported income. Id. Under
Section (1) of the Restrictions on Interest Rates Act, the usury rate Is presently
25%, as determined by presidential decree. HYUN-AM, supra note 93, at 1068.
239. Yoo, supra note 234, at 79.
240. Id. at 76.
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income. 24 1 Annual losses in tax revenues arising from the large
underground economy range in the billions of dollars. 2 42 Under
these conditions, the tax collection and audit systems must be
improved in order to generate significant tax revenues to support
the necessary increases in government salaries for low-level
public employees.
Such changes require institutional tax
2 43
reform.
The optimal enforcement theory is applicable here as well in
terms of increasing government salaries in a cost-effective
manner. A rise in income in legal activities, which reduces the
incentive to commit a crime, serves to reduce the aggregate
number of offenses. 24 4 In the present context, a higher salary
would decrease the utility of accepting a bribe for the public
employee contemplating the act. A higher income would thus
reduce the incentive to resort to bribery and would lower the total
number of bribery offenses. The critical question is as to the

extent that government salaries should be increased.

Here,

salaries should be raised only to the level whereby the social cost
of raising salaries for low-level public employees does not
outweigh the social gain from the decreased incidence of bribery
among such employees.

VI. CONCLUSION

To be sure, the present problem of government corruption
will not cause the demise of Korea. Korea has already shown the
world that it can overcome obstacles through its remarkable
industrial progress. In grand fashion, Korea prosecuted and
convicted two former Presidents for their prior misdeeds
committed while in office. However, apart from the prospects for
reunification, the persisting problem of bribery must be resolved if
Korea seeks to realize its full potential as a nation. Reforms must
restore the honor traditionally associated with public office. The
government must regain its credibility with the people in order to
establish the proper foundation for further national advancement.
Efforts to resolve the problem of corruption among
government officials require the following measures. First, the

241.

Id. at 78.

242.

Id. at 81.

In 1992, some observers estimated the underground

economy to total nearly $40 billion, comprising nearly 14% of the GNP.

See

KOREA: BusiNEss 7 (World Trade Press 1994).
243. A discussion as to how such tax reform may be accomplished is

beyond the scope of this Note and is an interesting topic for another endeavor.
244.

Becker. supra note 179, at 177.
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antibribery laws must be optimally enforced. The levels of
punishment for bribery presently available under the general and
special statutes do not warrant any changes. But the probability
of apprehension and conviction regarding corrupt officials must
be increased to achieve optimality. Optimality can be reached by
pursuing relatively larger cases of bribery under the special
statutes, which would permit the efficient use of law enforcement
resources. Efficient law enforcement would be supported by the
Korean culture's emphasis on social status as well as the greater
sensitivity to threatened consequences shared by public officials.
Second, the Korean Constitution must be amended to allow
immediate criminal sanctions against the President for bribery

committed during the presidential term. Such an amendment
would ensure optimal enforcement of the antibribery laws
because the President is unlikely to be impeached, and the delay
of criminal prosecution until the end of the term would
compromise optimal deterrence. Finally, salaries must be raised
for public positions with low levels of income. Higher salaries will
decrease the financial necessity among low-level public employees
to engage in bribery. The necessary increases in government
salaries point to the need to improve the tax collection and audit
systems. Improved tax collection will generate the significant tax
revenues needed to subsidize the higher salaries.
It will take time to redress the effects of over three decades of
prior government corruption. Reducing the incidence of bribery
will demand a fundamental change in the Korean way of thinking.
Although meaningful reform will be difficult to achieve, Korea can
attain an ethical government in order to continue its national
development and prosper well into the twenty-first century. If
recent reform efforts are to be long-lived and extend beyond the
current presidential term, the antibribery laws need to become
the primary means for reform. The laws against bribery must
assume the role of educating government officials that if they are
to truly have honor, they must preserve the integrity of their
office. The laws must ultimately convey that being ethical is not
square. Being ethical is in.

Daniel Y. Jun

